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Foreword 
Inspired by my internship at UNICEF the Netherlands, I have chosen the subject of Children’s 
Rights for my thesis. I started my internship in January 2014 at the department Children’s 
Rights with the activities of research and advocacy. The main subjects I was introduced to 
were ‘Children’s Rights and Business Principles’ and ‘the Dutch immigration policies’. I have 
chosen the latter subject for my master thesis, because I was intrigued by the complexity of 
the immigration policy from the perspective of the position of the child. Besides that, the 
subject fitted well in my master Political Science: Conflict and Cooperation at the University 
of Leiden. This study gave me the opportunity to dive into the theory of compliance and to be 
introduced to several stakeholders in the field of immigration, providing me different insights 
and a lot of new relevant information. 
 I would like to thank all the stakeholders who took the time to meet with me and answer my 
questions. Furthermore, I would like to thank my colleagues at UNICEF the Netherlands who 
gave me the opportunity to work for and with them and who supported me during the process 
of writing my thesis. Besides UNICEF I would like to thank my supervisor Frank de Zwart 
for his support, his critical view and the constructive feedback on my work. 
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Introduction 
 
The Dutch state has a legal responsibility to protect refugee children from the moment they 
arrive in the Netherlands. The question whether the state fulfils this obligation in a correct 
manner is the subject of this thesis. To illustrate, the war in Syria just entered is in its fourth 
year of conflict. More than 2.5 million of the refugees fled to another country than Syria and 
more than half of these refugees are children.
1
 In 2013, the immigration authority
2
 in the 
Netherlands received a total of 2675 asylum requests from Syria. 765 requests came from 
minors
3
. Besides Syria, other minors that requested asylum in 2013 in the Netherlands are 
mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.
4
 In total, 5660 refugee children entered the 
Netherlands that year. There can be different reasons to flee to the Netherlands, such as (civil) 
war, trafficking or female genital mutilation (FGM).  
  The legal responsibility of the Netherlands to protect these refugee children as soon as 
they arrive in the Netherlands has been written down in several legal human rights documents. 
According to the Refugee Convention, the Netherlands has the responsibility to protect 
refugees when they arrive in the Netherlands.  This applies especially to vulnerable groups 
such as children. The most important instrument for children is the Convention on the Right 
of the Child (UNCRC and from now on called ‘the Convention’) which consists solely of 
children’s rights. 5 The Convention contains civil, political, social and economic rights for 
children. The document contains obligations for the state, for government authorities, judges 
and other private organizations.
6
 In case of the Netherlands, children’s rights are applicable to 
all children located in the Netherlands, including refugee children. One of the main principles 
of the Convention is article 3, ‘the best interest of the child’. According to this article the 
interest of the child should be the primary consideration when a decision is made that 
concerns a child (Rodrigues 2012, 14; Reneman 2011, 349).  
  However, the Convention is not always adequately considered in the Dutch 
                                                          
1 Engel, S. (14 March 2014). Drie burgeroorlog in Syrië, een overzicht. Trouw. 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/13953/Burgeroorlog-in-Syrie/article/detail/3613067/2014/03/14/Drie-jaar-burgeroorlog-in-Syrie-
een-overzicht.dhtml 
2 Immigratie and Naturalisatie Dienst (IND), in the study I will refer to immigration authority. 
3 The term minors defines both unaccompanied children and accompanied children. This means that some children enter the 
Netherlands alone and are unaccompanied when they arrive. There also children that enter the Netherlands with their parents 
and/or family, which are defined as accompanied children.  
4 Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (2013). Survey of asylum requests [Data file]. Retrieved from: 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=81478NED&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0-1&D4=0-2,8,13-
14,24,28,30,33&D5=118&HDR=G2,G1,G3&STB=T,G4&VW=T 
5 From now on the UNCRC shall be appointed as Convention. If there will be talked about Conventions in general the word 
treaty will be used. 
6 General comment No 5 (2003), General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art.4, 42 
and 44, para 6), p.3-4, ve04000959. 
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immigration policy. The situation and position of the child in the immigration procedure is 
often related to the parents and family. Consequently, in most cases the best interest of the 
child is not the primary consideration, often other interests are considered first when a policy 
decision is taken (Rodrigues 2012, 14-15). Besides studies and reports on the position of the 
child in immigration policy, this observation is supported by several practical examples. 
According to different human right organizations – like UNICEF the Netherlands, Defence 
for Children and Amnesty International
7
 - the Netherlands violates various Human Rights 
Conventions in the implementation of its immigration policy, and in particular, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. These observations concern several violations of the 
Convention, such as placing refugee children in detention and the psychological damage 
brought to these children as a result of the asylum procedure and procedures for (forced) 
return. 
  The primary question in this study is: ‘why is the immigration policy non-compliant 
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, while a country as the Netherlands is 
generally emphasising human rights in their policies?’. Is there a different interpretation of the 
Convention by various actors? Or is it just because of more “practical” reasons? To answer 
these questions this study will first look into the theoretical discussion of compliance of 
human rights treaties. The leading theory used in this study will be ‘domestic mobilisation and 
advocacy’ (Simmons 2009, 125).   
   According to the theory of ‘domestic mobilisation and advocacy’ the effectiveness of a 
treaty is mainly the result of domestic mobilisation and advocacy towards the government by 
domestic actors, such as Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), political parties and the 
media (Simmons 2009, 125-126). This theory is a response of Simmons on other scholars of 
international relations who are often pessimistic about the ability to enforce international 
human rights law on a national level Mearsheimer 1994,5; Goldsmith & Posner 2005,134). 
Despite monitoring mechanisms, as in the UN-human rights Committee and the proliferation 
of treaties, there is no international legal authority to enforce the rules. Besides, governments 
do not have a political or financial reason to stimulate foreign states to comply with human 
rights treaties. “Human rights law lacks the built-in incentives that have proven remarkably 
effective at promoting compliance in other areas of decentralized international governance, 
such as trade and arms control” (Thomas 2014, 4). As a result, there is a lack of compliance 
pull within international law. However, Simmons criticizes this view, because it is focused on 
relations between states (interstate relations). In contrast to the theory of domestic politics and 
                                                          
7 Interview 1-4 
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advocacy, which is focused on the internal structures and dynamics of states (state-society 
relations). The international scholars did not recognize the effectiveness of human rights as a 
powerful tool for domestic actors to put pressure on governments (Simmons 2009, 114-115; 
Thomas 2014, 5). Compliance of human rights should sooner be found at the domestic level 
of states and through transnational mobilisation (Simmons 2009, 125-126; Hathaway 2002, 
1954; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998).  
  To be able to explain the marginal position of children and violations of the 
Convention within the immigration policy this study makes use of Simmons’ theory which 
focuses on ‘domestic mobilisation and advocacy’. In addition, Jasper Krommendijk 
researched the effectiveness of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child by monitoring the Convention and concluded that in general the domestic politics 
and advocacy around the Convention is very effective in the Netherlands (Krommendijk 
2014).
 8
 However, the Convention has nonetheless been violated on different fronts within the 
Dutch immigration policy. Therefore, the question is, if the domestic mobilisation and 
advocacy are so effective, why then do we find these violations of children’s rights in the 
immigration policies or are there other factors that influence compliance with the 
Convention? This observed discrepancy can partly be explained by the friction between the 
duty of the state to protect minor refugees, and the state’s objective to implement restrictive 
policies. In chapter 3 this view will be supported by several mechanisms that have relevance 
for compliance with the Convention. 
  To identify the violations of the Convention in the immigration policy, this study 
consists of a literature research, an analysis of policy documents, recommendations of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, NGO reports and interviews with stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the study will use the theory on political mobilisation and advocacy to look at 
the compliance of the Convention on Dutch immigration policy. The analysis will be 
deepened and supplemented by an analysis of 14 interviews with stakeholders such as 
representatives of human rights organizations, policy officers of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice, policy officers of political parties, a policy officer of the local government, lawyers, a 
guardian and a scholar. The interviews show the different views on the position of the child 
from several involved parties within the Dutch immigration policy. These interviews provide 
additional material in order to understand the violations and the lack of compliance with the 
Convention and provide practical examples of the issues at stake. The interviews are semi-
                                                          
8
 Concluding Observations are legally speaking non-binding and lack instruments to enforce compliance of the Convention. 
7 
 
structured, either face-to-face or by phone. A part of the questions was fixed, so the 
interviews could easily be compared. To respect the different nature of the various 
organizations, there was room to “go in more detail” during the interviews whenever this 
proved to be useful.
9
  
  In the first chapter of this study certain tensions between the Convention and the 
Dutch immigration policies are discussed and certain violations of the Convention by the 
Dutch government within the immigration policies are outlined. In the second chapter, the 
theory of political mobilisation and advocacy is described. Finally, in the third chapter this 
will be followed by an analysis of violations of the Convention within the immigration 
policies. This is done by partly applying the theory of political mobilisation and advocacy, 
supported by additional interviews with stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 See for the interview questions appendix II. 
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1. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and domestic politics on 
immigration policies in the Netherlands 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is an international treaty which the 
United Nations accepted on November 20, 1989. The Netherlands signed the Convention on 
January 26, 1990 and ratified it on February 6, 1995. Besides the Netherlands, 193 other 
member states ratified the Convention, apart from the United States, Somalia and South-
Sudan.
10
 The ratification of the Convention means that the document is legally binding. This 
implies that the member states are obliged to implement the provisions of the Convention in 
the legislation and policies (Beltman & Zijlstra 2013, 3).  
  The Convention consists of 54 articles in total. These articles define the rights of every 
child in the world. In these articles it is written, for example, that children have the right to 
education, health care, childcare and a place to live and play. Furthermore, these articles cover 
topics such as the right of protection against abuse, child labour and the consequences of war 
and sexual exploitation. The Convention covers all the areas of the life of a child.
11
 It has four 
basic principles that serve as a framework for each article in the Convention: the principle of 
equality (art. 2), the interest of the child (art. 3), the right to life and development (art. 6) and 
the right to participate in matters that concern the child (art. 12). These rights are meant for 
every child in the world, including refugee children, asylum-seeking children in families, 
unaccompanied children (or in one term ‘children on the move’) (Van Os 2012, 68).12 
  Compliance with the Convention is monitored by the UN- Committee on the Rights of 
the Child who can issue recommendations to the member states.
13
 Almost every human rights 
treaty has a monitoring body, responsible for a number of tasks. In case of the Convention the 
                                                          
10 After twelve years the UNCRC is expanded with two Optional Protocols. The first is the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. The second is the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. 
Both protocols are ratified by 140 countries, including the Netherlands 
11 UNICEF the Nederland. The Convention on the Rights of the Child Consulted on 16 March 2014. 
.http://www.unicef.nl/wat-doet-unicef/kinderrechten/kinderrechtenverdrag/ 
12 The definition of Children on the move: ‘children  moving  for  a  variety  of  reasons, voluntarily or involuntarily, within 
or between countries, with or without their parents or other primary caregivers, and whose movement while it may open up 
opportunities might also place them at risk (or at an increased risk) of economic or sexual exploitation,  abuse,  neglect  and 
 violence”. This is defined by the Inter-agency Working Group on Children. It includes the following agencies: ILO, IOM, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, Plan International, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, the AfricanMovement of Working Children 
and Youths (AMWCY/MAEJT), Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA), World Vision, the 
OakFoundation and individual experts and academics. Consulted on 14 June 2014: http://www.gmfc.org/en/action-within-
the-movement/gmc-actions/actions-by-imperatives/other-campaigns-a-actions/current-actions/90.  
13
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child is an independent body of experts that reports and monitors on the 
implementation of the UNCRC by the member states that ratify the Convention. Every member state has to report every five 
years to the Committee.  
9 
 
supervision by the monitoring body is based upon several tasks. The first task is the process of 
state reporting. The Committee gives recommendations known as Concluding Observations 
(Cos), as a response on the written reports by states and NGO’s.14 These Concluding 
Observations are legally speaking non-binding and there are no instruments to enforce 
compliance with the Convention. Secondly, the committee provides general comments, based 
on organized theme discussions with ratified states. The purpose of the general comments is 
to further explain treaty articles and to assist in interpreting the treaty. The general comments 
are not binding, but only authoritative. Furthermore, in some cases the Committee will make a 
country visit. (Heida 2012, 2-3). The fact that the recommendations are not binding means 
that (most of the time) the Committee does not have enough influence to ensure full 
compliance of a Convention (Krommendijk 2013, 17). 
  In the last Concluding Observations (2009) the UN-Committee on the Rights of the 
Child recommends the Netherlands in case of the most vulnerable groups of children, such as 
children on the move, to improve access to their rights and give the principle of ‘the best 
interest of the child’ (art. 3 UNCRC) a stronger position in law, legislation and policies (Van 
Os 2012, 68).
15
 In order to make this happen, more than a (legally) non-binding treaty body is 
necessary. Krommendijk argues that the possibility of implementation of the 
recommendations of the Committee is, in essence, a political decision. “Non- legal 
circumstances primarily determine whether or not the recommendations of the Committee are 
acted upon at the domestic level” (Krommendijk 2014, 1).   
 
The position of the child in Dutch immigration law 
Children who enter the Netherlands and go through the asylum procedure, can be 
distinguished into two groups. The first are the unaccompanied children, the second are 
children arriving with their parents and/or family. The first group has an independent legal 
access which means their interest is considered during the procedure. However, this does not 
indicate that the decisions within the procedure are always based on the best interest of the 
child. For the second group, the asylum application will be submitted by one main applicant. 
This means that primarily the situation of the main applicant, usually one of the parents, is 
taken into account. When the main applicant meets the conditions as set out in the Dutch 
                                                          
14
 Others, as in for example NGO’s, are allowed to submit information for the report. In case of the Kinderrechtencollectief, a 
NGO coalition on the rights of the child, write together a NGO report about the implementation of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in The Netherlands. Besides a report written by children will be submitted, de jongerenrapportage.   
15 Concluding Observations 30 January 2009. CRC/C/NLD/CO/3. 
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immigration law 2000, both the main applicant and the rest of the family are granted the right 
to (temporary) residence. If the applicant does not meet the requirements, this will also apply 
to the children of the main applicant. The position of a child, therefore, is not primarily 
considered during this procedure. There is the possibility for a child to start his or her own 
procedure, but this is not very common (Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2008, 7). 
  The immigration procedure of the Netherlands is based on the immigration law 
2000.
16
 This law was renewed in 2000 to make the immigration procedure faster, stricter and 
more efficient. It contains the Dutch regulations around the immigration procedure, which 
covers access, admittance, deportation, supervision and border control. In this law the rules 
are defined for the procedure concerning return to the country of origin or for receiving a 
residence permit (Blaak et.al. 2005, 451-461). 
   Minors have been categorized in three classes in the Immigration law. The first is 
“asylum seekers”: unaccompanied minors or minors with their families who have requested 
asylum in the Netherlands (article 28 and 29 Vw). The second category is called “migrants”: 
minors that requested asylum in the Netherlands based on reasons other than grounds of 
asylum (article 12, 15 en16 Vw). The third category is called “undocumented”: refugee 
children who do not have legal residence in the Netherlands, because they have exhausted all 
legal remedies and who are not allowed to await their residence procedure in the Netherlands 
or refugee children who have never requested a residence permit (Blaak et. al. 2005, 455). 
Over all, the Convention is applicable to all children residing in the Netherlands, including 
undocumented children.  
  Several authors have noted the lack of policy concerning how the interest of the child 
has been taken into consideration in the immigration law and policies of the Netherlands 
(Reneman 2011, 350-351; Beltman & Zijlstra 2013, 2-5). According to Rodrigues, the 
interests of children are generally judged by the relationship of children with their parents and 
family, instead of looking into the individual interests of a child (Rodrigues 2012, 14-15). 
Article 3 of the Convention ‘the best interest of the child’ should be the fundamental concern 
and the first consideration by the judge in deciding on an immigration case. Nearly all 
stakeholders who have been interviewed for this study describe the position of the child as 
“overshadowed”.17  According to Carla van Os from Defence for Children “the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child must be leading in the immigration policy”.18 
  According to the Dutch government the protection of minors is incorporated in the 
                                                          
16 In Dutch: de Vreemdelingenwet 2000. 
17 Interviews 1-12 
18 Interview 4 
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immigration policies. The executive government bodies, the Immigration en Naturalisatie 
Dienst (IND) and the Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek (DTV), both assume that the policy takes 
the Convention into account. According to Karen Temmnink (DTV), “the Convention is 
integrated in the law and regulations and that is what we put into practice. We assume that the 
Convention is included in the policy”.19 It is the IND who reviews the cases and decides 
whether the perspective and position of the child is considered. In practice, this means that the 
Convention should also be considered during the implementation of the policy. Subsequently, 
it is the duty of the court to judge the implementation of the Convention in a specific case. 
  However, in practice the court may decide that a provision does not have direct effect. 
In this case, no rights have to be derived. If a provision has direct effect, it should be 
examined whether the national legislation is not in conflict with this provision. If that is the 
case, the national legislation is not applicable, because international law prevails over national 
law. Based on article 3 of the Convention ‘the best interest of the child’ has partial direct 
effect, which means further elaboration in national legislation is necessary.
20
 The Council of 
State argues through established jurisprudence that the core determination of article 3.1 
contains, by the formulation, no norm that is directly applicable by the court, because the 
article is not concrete enough for such purposes (Reneman 2011, 351). Therefore, the court is 
not in the position to give their own judgment, but is only competent to assess whether the 
governmental body (IND) based their decision on the Convention. Besides, the immigration 
judge has a marginal position which is partly inherent to the nature of the administrative law. 
This in contrast to the criminal court judge who is allowed to play an active role and is 
obligated to assess the correctness of the involved treaty (Limbeek 2012, 170-173). The 
immigration law on the other hand is characterized by a  marginal position of the judge who is 
only  allowed to examine the decisions of the authority, in this case the immigration authority 
(IND) and cannot review the content of the decision (Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2008, 7 -8).  
 It is a fact that children in the asylum procedure fall, in principle, under the 
administrative law, rather than under civil or juvenile law. Dutch children that are judged 
under civil or juvenile justice attend a court with a judge who is specialized in juvenile 
legislation. In immigration law, the judge has no specific expertise on the development and 
interests of a child. Furthermore, the juvenile judges cannot make an appeal on experts such 
as an officer from the Council for Child Protection or behavioral scientists which are part of 
                                                          
19 Interview 14 
20
 The Council has judged that also article 2 (the prohibition of discrimination), article 22 (rights of refugee children), article 
37 (which consists of norms of children in detention) do not have direct effect. Article 12 does have direct effect (the right to 
participate and to be heard). These articles are mainly related to the immigration law. 
12 
 
the legal proceedings of juvenile law, because these experts are not part of the legal 
proceedings of immigration. Eventually, this means that lawyers have the responsibility to 
bring the child’s best interest forward during the proceedings. Niene Oepkes from the local 
government notes “the presence of strong lawyers is necessary to provide resistance”21 
However, this shows in practice inadequate result, as expertise on the development of children 
is seldom adequately included during the proceedings (Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2008, 7 -8).  
    In addition to the Convention, children’s rights also have an important position 
in EU-law and in specific EU-migration law. First, article 3.3. of the Treaty on the Function 
of the European Union states that the EU promotes the rights of children. Furthermore, article 
24 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes children’s rights 
and is binding since the Convention of Lisbon in 2008 (Rodrigues 2012, 14). The purpose of 
the Charter is to reinforce the protection of the fundamental rights and bind the member states 
to the extent that they reinforce the rights of the Union. Second, the asylum directives, Family 
Reunification Directive and the Returns Directive refer to children’s rights. This results in the 
development that the European Court of Justice is authorized to give binding statements about 
the meaning of children’s rights to the extent of the EU-law (Reneman 2011, 355-357). The 
European Court of Justice monitors the rights of children closely. There have been several 
cases in which article 24 from the Charter has played a central role in the decision for minors. 
In 2011 the Court decided that the Charter should be used in individual cases in the member 
states by the national judges and other authorities. This means that article 24 from the Charter 
can be used directly for minors in immigration cases (Rodrigues 2012, 10-15). 
  The Dutch government and judiciaries are required to follow the European Law. 
According to both the lawyers Pieter Bogaers and Corien Ullersma, the European law and 
mainly article 24 of the Charter has, in their own experiences, more effect than the 
Convention.
22
 Nevertheless, in some cases the lower judges in the Netherlands give 
application to the provisions of the Convention that have no direct effect according to the 
Council. In most of these cases support from article 24 of the Charter was necessary for the 
argumentation of the lawyer (Limbeek 2012, 170-173).  
  Besides the legal arguments within the asylum procedure of immigration policy the 
Convention is, in practice, not fully considered. The next paragraph will show several 
examples of situations in which the Convention is not completely followed in the immigration 
policies and will show multiple cases in which the position of the child is overshadowed.  
                                                          
21 Interview 6 
22
 Interview 8 and 9 
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Violations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child  
 Three examples will show violations of the Convention in the immigration policies. These 
examples have been mentioned by several interests groups or coalitions of multiple human 
rights organizations. These cases give an indication of violations on all the different aspects of 
the policy. The first example is related to entering the Netherlands or returning to the country 
of origin, the second example is about the violation within the asylum-seeking procedure and 
the third example is about the effect of forced return and long-lasting procedures on children.  
 
Detention 
By putting refugee children in detention during the procedure, the immigration policies are 
not in accordance with provisions of the Convention.
23
 Detention is used during immigration 
procedure when children with their families enter the Netherlands by plane before they are 
eligible for protection in the Netherlands (art. 6 Vw).
24
 If they enter the Netherlands by land, 
they are received in reception centers instead of detention. Besides at entering the 
Netherlands, detention is also used for a maximum of 14 days (art. 59 Vw) when children and 
their parents are forced to return to their country of origin (Coalitie Geen Kind in de Cel
25
 
2014, 4-9; Kinderrechtencollectief 2012, 61). In 2012, 352 children in families and 70 
unaccompanied children were put in detention. The number of children in families that stayed 
in detention has decreased since 2013, when 280 children were detained. The number of 
unaccompanied children that were detained decreased to 30
26
. 
   The UN Committee on the Right of the Child has established that detention of children 
cannot be justified for migration status.
27
 Different articles of the Convention are violated by 
this part of the immigration policies. Firstly, the policy violates article 37 of the Convention: 
“no child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time”. This means 
                                                          
23
 Concluding Observations 30 January 2009. CRC/C/NLD/CO/3. 
24 Unaccompanied children are not placed in detention, but go directly to a reception centers and really young children will be 
placed in a family. 
25 The report ‘Papa, hebben we iets ergs gedaan: Kinderen en Ouders in Vreemdelingendetentie’ from the Coalitie Geen 
Kind in de Cel (2014). Translation:  ‘Daddy did we do something wrong: Children and their parents in Detention of Aliens’ 
from the Coalition No Child in Prison (2014). The coalition ‘Geen Kind in de Cel’ consists of Amnesty International, 
Defence for Children, Stichting INLIA, Kerk in Actie, Stichting Kinderpostzegels Nederland, Stichting Los, UNICEF 
Nederland en Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland. 
26 Annual reports. Defence for Children and UNICEF the Netherlands: Jaarbericht  Kinderrechten 2014.  
27 General Comment No. 6 (2005), Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin. 
ve04000959. 
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that detention should only be used as the ultimate remedy. Secondly, the state should respect 
the rights and responsibilities of the parents to protect their own children (art. 5 UNCRC). By 
detention the state deprives parents of these rights, because parents have no influence on the 
duration and the conditions of the detention. Thirdly, experiences in detention are 
traumatizing and violate the interests of the child and the right for protection of their 
development (art. 3 & 6 UNCRC) (Pinheiro 2006, 189; Steel 2006). These are children who 
are already traumatized by the experience of conflict for which they fled and the uncertainties 
of traveling to the Netherlands. These children are considered a vulnerable group and they 
have, according to art. 22 of the Convention, a right to special protection (Coalitie Geen Kind 
in de Cel 2014, 21).  
  The experience of detention causes psychological damage to these children. This is 
unnecessary, because there are alternatives to take care of these children and their parents. An 
exemplary alternative is found in Sweden. The circumstances in detention centers in Sweden 
are more humane. For example, there is no barbed wire used, the doors of the rooms are not 
locked and only the outside door is closed. The recreation room and outdoor area is open the 
whole day and there is a gym. This creates different circumstances for children and is less 
traumatizing than detention in the Netherlands (Coalitie Geen Kind in de Cel 2014, 47). 
Moving  
 Another example of the violation of the Convention is the frequency of moving from one 
asylum centre to another that is common practice during the asylum seeking procedure. 
Asylum seeking children move on average once a year while other Dutch children move 
around once every ten years. Because moving is an event which has a lot of impact on the 
development and the mental status of a child, this aspect of the asylum procedure is 
considered to be harmful. Every step in the Dutch asylum procedure requires moving to 
another centre to follow the procedure for a final decision for a residence permit or for a 
decision to return to the country of origin (Werkgroep Kind in azc 2013, 7-8).
 28
 
  Every family that appeals for asylum in the Netherlands will initially be “housed” in a 
central care centre.
29
 From there the entire family, including children, will move to a 
location
30
 for the first phase of the asylum procedure. Further on in the procedure, the family 
                                                          
28 Werkgroep Kind in azc ‘Ontheemd: De verhuizingen van asielzoekerskinderen in Nederland’. The Werkgroep Kind in azc 
is a cooperation between UNICEF the Netherlands, Defence for Childeren, Vluchtelingenwerk, Kinderpostzegels and Kerk in 
Actie. See www.kind-in-azc.nl.  
29 In Dutch ‘centrale opvanglocatie’ (col). 
30 In Dutch ‘proces opvanglocatie’ (pol). 
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must move to yet another reception centre,
31
 or move directly to a location with restricted 
freedom,
32
 or move to a family location
33
 which is focused on return to the country of origin. 
Besides the required movements that are part of the procedure, children and their families are 
often required to move between reception centres because the policy is based on occupancy 
rates. Furthermore, there are only a few permanent locations in the Netherlands and the rest 
are all centres based on temporary contracts which often results in forced relocations 
(Werkgroep Kind in azc 2013, 9-14). According to the research of Beiske Kooistra
34
 among 
132 asylum-seeking children in the Netherlands, they moved in total 421 times in an average 
of four years. The most common reason was because of a decision during the asylum 
procedure. The second most common reason was the fact that the centre had to close down.  
  The consequences of this policy, set up by the authorities, are harmful for children.  
British research demonstrates that moving is harmful for the (psychological) health of 
children, in particular the changing between schools. This is mainly caused by losing social 
networks on a regular basis (Fazel & Stein 2003, 134-135). Furthermore, if asylum-seeking 
children move four times or more they experience significant harm to their development. The 
strongest effects are on feelings of safety and on school performances (Nielson et. al. 2008, 
293). However, it is difficult to indicate the harm on an individual level, because these 
children are already traumatized by conflict and by fleeing from their country of origin 
(Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2011). Besides, asylum-seeking children are in general more 
vulnerable than other children, because of the circumstances they have to deal with. The 
asylum procedure creates a lot of uncertainties and moving frequently can be an extra risk to 
the development of an asylum-seeking child (Fazel & Stein 2003, 134-135).  
  This part of the immigration policies violates the Convention on several articles. First, 
article 3 ‘the best interest of the child’ is violated. In every decision the authority makes, the 
interest of the child should be primarily considered. Second, the movements that are a 
consequence of the policies violate article 6 on the right on life and development. As 
mentioned before, frequently moving asylum-seeking children can be harmful to their 
development. Furthermore, the policy violates article 28 and 29. Due to the movements that 
are a consequence of the policies concerning adequate  education children are often absent 
from school for a few weeks (Werkgroep Kind in azc 2013, 29-30; Kinderrechtencollectief 
2012, 57-58). 
                                                          
31 In Dutch ‘asielzoekerscentrum’(azc). 
32 In Dutch ‘vrijheidsbeperkende locatie’(vbl). 
33 In Dutch gezinslocatie.  
34 Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2012. 
16 
 
Forced return  
Besides the possible damage that may occur during the procedure, forced return can be a 
harmful experience for children. This is mainly the case where children are forced to return, 
after a long-term residency in the Netherlands. Long-term residency refers to the direction of 
a period of longer than five years. The severity of the damage differs per child, because of 
different conditions and characters. However, there are different factors of influence on the 
child within the situation of forced return; the duration of residence, the age of the child on 
the moment of forced return, the extent of ‘rootedness’, the amount of positive or negative 
memories or having memories in general, the number of changing cultures, the condition of 
the child (mentally and in health), the condition of the parents and the expectations for 
development in the country of origin. All these factors should be considered in relation to 
each other (Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2006, 3-19). 
  In the coalition agreement from Rutte II (2012), it is listed that asylum-seeking 
children in families and unaccompanied children who had residence for a long term in the 
Netherlands are eligible for a residence permit, under certain conditions.
 35
 In Dutch this 
agreement is called het Kinderpardon. There are refugee children staying in the Netherlands 
for a long time without prospect of a residence permit. The long term residence is mostly due 
to the procedures that took a long time in the past, refusing return and stacking procedures by 
their parents or a combination of all these factors. The purpose of the Kinderpardon is to 
make a permanent agreement with a transitional agreement as component which prevents 
future victims of stacking procedures. The transitional agreement provides clarity to the 
children with an asylum-seeking background, who have already spend a considerable time of 
five years or longer in the Netherlands. According to the government, the established 
permanent agreement should prevent future discussions about the responsibility of the 
government of long resident refugee children and this policy creates the possibility to 
objectively judge the responsibility of the government and/or the parents.
36
 The government’s 
rationale behind this agreement is the fact that children should not be the victim of stacking 
procedure
37
.   
  However, there are two concerns in relation to the Convention. The first concern is the 
formulation of the criteria within the agreement and the second concern is the implementation 
of the criteria. The first concern of the criteria is about children that are not part of the 
agreement which should be considered, because they became victim of stacking procedures 
                                                          
35 Bruggen slaan, Regeerakkoord VVD-PvdA, October 29 2012 (Cabinet Rutte II), ve12002172. 
36 TK 2012/13, 19637, nr. 1597.  
37 WBV 2013/1, wijziging Vreemdelingencirculaire d.d. 30 Januari 2013, Stcrt 31 Januari 2013, nr 2573, ve13000188. 
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and are five years or longer in the Netherlands.
38
 One of the criteria of the agreement is that it 
is only meant for asylum-seeking children. This means that children, who started a proceeding 
based on other grounds, such as work visa of their parents, medical grounds or trafficking, are 
excluded from the agreement. Within the agreement no motivation is given for this inequality 
of treatment. The agreement makes a distinction based on procedural background instead of 
best interest of the child. At the end, whatever the procedural background is, the agreement 
should be about the long-term residence of the children and the damaging consequences. For 
this last point the consequences for the children will not differ, because of procedural 
background (Grütter & Van Os 2013, 312-315). The Children’s ombudsman Marc Dullaert 
argues that the difference between asylum-seeking children that are staying for five years or 
longer in the Netherlands and non-asylum-seeking children within the same situation but on 
other criteria is indefensible. The agreement seems contrary to the principle of non-
discrimination in Article 2 of the Convention and Article 14 of the ECHR
39
. 
  The second concern is that the implementation of one of the criteria within the 
agreement is not following the principle of the best interest of the child adequately. The 
criteria state that children (and parents) should remain under government surveillance. 
However, if, for whatever reason, they are excluded from this surveillance they lose their right 
to het Kinderpardon. The demarcation is intended to exclude people that have deliberately 
been hiding from the government. According to the Children Ombudsman Marc Dullaert, 
there are about 100 children that were not supervised by these specific authorities, but were 
supervised or known by the local government, school and/or social services and have not been 
deliberately hiding from the government.
40
 It is unclear in the agreement why the supervision 
by the last named institutions is not enough to fulfill the criteria (Ullersma and Werner 2013, 
472-473). In this case the procedural background is placed above the interest of the child, 
even if this criterion does not change anything about the basic principle of the agreement. 
Whether children are under supervision of the government or other authorities does not make 
a difference for the long-term residence of the children and subsequent consequences. 
Although this agreement is specifically about and for children, it is not in line with the 
Convention. 
                                                          
38 De kinderombudsman (26 may 2014). Kinderombudsman over Kinderpardon: geen ruimhartigheid, maar rechtvaardigheid. 
http://www.dekinderombudsman.nl/70/ouders-professionals/nieuws/kinderombudsman-over-kinderpardon-geen-
ruimhartigheid-maar-rechtvaardigheid/?id=389.   
39 See 39  
40 See 39 
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  Both the described legal and practical circumstances summed up in this chapter show 
that the Convention is not fully ensured in the immigration policies. In the following chapter 
the theory on compliance will be discussed to outline how treaties are integrated in the 
domestic policies and there will be explored why the immigration policies are in violation 
with the Convention.  
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2. Domestic mobilisation and advocacy 
Koskenniemi compares human rights to love as, “necessary and impossible”, and “we cannot 
live without them, but we cannot have them, either” (Koskenniemi 2011, 153). He notes a 
contradiction between international law that aims to create space for non-political normativity 
and the politics of states. Non-political normativity of international law is undermined by the 
experience of the meaning of rights and how they are applied, which in itself can only be 
determined by the politics of states. This creates both positive feelings such as local support 
and enthusiasm, but may also lead to negative emotions like cynicism with stakeholders 
(Koskennieme 2011, 153).  
  In the literature it is therefore argued that pursuing international law, and more specific 
human rights, is not only a legal phenomenon but it is also related to politics. Politics can be 
highly effective at a normative level. Domestic politics are important factors for the 
effectiveness of international rights, norms and given recommendations (Koskenniemi 1990; 
Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Krommendijk 2014). Many authors argue that within domestic 
politics, factors like domestic mobilisation and advocacy by pressure of domestic actors 
towards the government are important for the effectiveness of human rights treaties 
(Krommendijk 2013, 225). “The real politics of change is likely to occur at the domestic 
level” (Simmons 2009, 125-126). This study will therefore use the theory of effective lobby 
efforts and domestic mobilisation in order to explain why in the Netherlands the Convention 
is frequently violated and not fully implemented in the immigration policies. 
  The theory of domestic mobilisation and advocacy is introduced by Beth Simmons 
(2009) who shows that human rights treaties can make a difference for domestic politics. She 
argues that ratification of a treaty can affect policies and rights practices in a state. 
International scholars are critical towards this subject and argue that international law is a 
strong normative concept, but still an underdeveloped law system. According to Simmons the 
scholars have a pessimistic vision on the ability of the international law, because they look at 
the interstate relations rather than the state-society relations. Scholars are blind for the cross-
border relationship between states and non-state actors. In her opinion the interstate relation is 
merely an explanation for ratification of treaties, but not applicable to compliance issues. 
(Simmons 2009, 114; see also Thomas 2014,5).  
  The theory of Simmons is an answer to the question ‘what drives compliance in 
human rights within international law systems?’ The most classic answer is state power and 
state interests. According to the realists, governments only comply to treaties if it does not 
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conflict with one of their national interests and if the treaty is consistent with their national 
agenda (Mearsheimer 1994, 5; Goldsmith & Posner 2005, 134). “Governments will not 
honour international human rights treaties when it is not in their interests to do so”, as 
Simmons (2009) summarizes the realist position. Besides, realists argue that compliance with 
treaties is only possible if there is a form of enforcement. In case of human rights treaties, 
according to the realists, there is a lack of enforcement because the system of international 
law does not have a central authority that enforces compliance (Simmons 2009, 116).  
  The lack of central authority to identify and punish violators of the law is one of the 
reasons that the international law systems have less compliance pull then the national laws 
system (Thomas 2014, 4). The concept of “compliance pull” explains the thought that 
legitimacy of a treaty creates a form of compliance based on the authority and persuasion of a 
treaty (Simmons 2009, 122). The lack of compliance within international law can furthermore 
be explained by two reasons. First, international law is not reinforced through normative 
consensus among relevant actors. Second, the system does not have authoritative procedures 
to guide legal interpretation. Moreover, the lack of enforcement by an authority can be 
explained by the lack of incentives to expand economic and military resources to enforce 
human rights treaties around the world. This has proven to be remarkable effective in other 
areas of decentralized international governance (Simmons 2009, 122-123; Thomas 2014, 4). 
  Besides the compliance pull, scholars argue that possible damage of reputation (by 
naming and shaming) can also result in a desire to comply (Schimmelfenning 2005, 831-832). 
According to Robert Keohane, “reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and 
concern about the effects of precedents” is one of the reasons that governments follow the 
rules of international regimes (Keohane 1984, 106). However, enforcement by reputation for 
human rights on international level does not have the effect of compliance, because a 
reputation is not easily established when the behaviour of a state is difficult to observe, as  
information about the assets is mainly internally organized (Simmons 2009, 117). According 
to Downs and Jones, reputation in international law is mostly relevant in trade and security 
situations, rather than environmental and human rights issues (Downs & Jones 2002, 112). As 
Thomas (2014) argues, “governments have little reason to care whether another government is 
violating the rights of its citizens. There is no reciprocity dynamic that might motivate 
governments to comply with human rights rules as doing so could contradict deeply held 
values or jeopardize their hold on power” (Thomas 2014, 4). Punishing governments by the 
international society, because of human rights violations is probably conflicting with other 
foreign policy objectives (Simmons 2009, 122-123; Dai 2005). 
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  A theory of compliance for human rights treaties, within the context of international 
politics, is difficult to establish. However, Simmons does not mean that international human 
rights treaties are always ineffective. She means that scholars have been analysing compliance 
theories for human rights treaties at the wrong level and argues that the impact of human 
rights treaties on governments can best be explained by the effects of domestic mobilisation 
and advocacy networks (Simmons 2009, 125; See also: Dai 2005, 388; Keck & Sikkink 1999, 
89-91). “Treaties are causally meaningful to the extent that they empower individuals, groups, 
or parts of states with different  rights preferences that were not empowered to the same 
extent in the absence of the treaties” (Simmons 2009, 125).  
  Simmons suggests three mechanisms through which domestic politics influences 
compliance with human rights treaties. These mechanisms are organized from the perspective 
of actors: the executive, mobilized individuals and the judiciary. The first mechanism is about 
executive powers of agenda-setting. This starts with considering the ratification of a treaty 
which can influence a country’s priorities or even the preferences of the set of policy options 
facing a government (Simmons 2009, 127; Downs et. al. 1996). This is a mechanism that is 
possible within states that are defined as sincere ratifiers: “states that value the content of the 
treaty and anticipate compliance” (Simmons 2009, 58).  Simmons defines ratifying states in 
two other categories, first the false negatives: “those that may be committed in principle but 
nonetheless fail to ratify” (Simmons 2009, 58), and the last category: strategic ratifiers: “they 
ratify because other countries are doing so, and they would prefer to avoid criticism” 
(Simmons 2009, 58). For the last two categories two different mechanisms are necessary for 
influencing domestic politics. 
  The second mechanism is the use of treaties as a tool by mobilized individuals to 
support political mobilisation and demand social and political change (Simmons 2009, 136). 
One of the reasons that people mobilize to demand political and social changes is because of 
the feeling that something is unjust in their society. This is related to the value people give to 
certain rights. Besides the value, people also mobilize based on the probability that they will 
be successful in their demands. This depends of course on the influence of the social 
movement and the shifts of power within the government. “The formation and success of 
social and political movements are often linked  to political, legal, organizational, or social 
changes that reduce the costs of mobilization and improve the likelihood of success” 
(Simmons 2009, 138; Jenkins 1983). 
  Behaviour of states can be changed by international law through pressurizing 
governments by mobilising domestic institutions, such as political parties, domestic advocacy 
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groups, domestic courts and NGO’s (Hathaway 2002, 1954). Furthermore, it is argued that 
this pressure from within the domestic institutions is the only way to demand change 
(Moravcsik 1995, 159; Krommendijk 2014, 4). This  means that “international norms and 
institutions can subsequently shift the balance of power within and between domestic actors 
and prompt a change in coalitions and calculations underlying governmental policies, which 
might eventually lead to a policy change” (Krommendijk 2014, 4). Within this, international 
law gives the mandate to strengthen the leverage and legitimize the demands of domestic 
institutions (Simmons 2009, 135; Dai 2005).    
  For the last mechanism Simmons argues that the leverage of litigation is influencing 
domestic politics. This implies that ratified treaties (among others) have implications for the 
role of judiciary. Treaties are enforceable legal obligations at a domestic level and can create 
possibilities for litigation by individuals and groups, to claim their rights in domestic politics.  
In legal systems that do not distinguish between domestic law and international law, ratified 
treaties are integrated in the domestic legal system. In such systems like in the Netherlands, 
international legal obligations are directly enforceable in domestic courts. This is another way 
for individuals and groups to provide an opportunity to claim rights within domestic politics. 
This makes litigation an important potential mechanism for compliance (Simmons 2009, 130-
133).  
  In the end, “for each of the mechanisms to be discussed, an official commitment to a 
specific body of international law helps local actors set priorities, define meaning, make rights 
demands, and bargain from a position of greater strength than would have been the case in the 
absence of their government’s treaty commitment” (Simmons 2009, 126). In the absence of 
political mobilisation states gain international legitimacy through human rights as a symbolic 
commitment with low costs. This implies that global expectations are important for states 
(Thomas 2014,9). As Simmons argues ‘strategic ratifiers’ ratify human rights treaties because 
the gains (avoiding criticism) are obvious, but the costs are unclear. Those who promote 
human rights in states where political mobilisation is present, have the challenge to overcome 
the political cost before human rights are fully respected by a state (Simmons 2009, 58; 
Thomas 2014, 9).  According to Keck and Sikkink (1999) domestic mobilisation can be 
supported by the international society to accomplish compliance by pointing at the possibility 
of creating a ‘boomerang effect’, which is used by domestic actors to bring pressure on their 
states from outside. This describes how domestic mobilisation is characterized by using 
transnational norms and networks to change state’s behaviour in the state-society relation 
between domestic actors, states and also international allies. For example NGO’s such as 
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Amnesty International and UNICEF use their transnational network to create a broader 
support to pressure and influence states for compliance with human rights. 
  According to Simmons (2009), well-established democracies, such as the Netherlands, 
have the best performance on compliance of treaties, but this is not because of treaty 
ratification. Rather in these states local actors already adequately try to mobilize behaviour of 
change. However, successful (transnational) dynamics of mobilized groups are not a 
guarantee for a perfect form of protection of human rights. It is also important how the state 
reacts to the pressure of the political mobilization. According to Thomas (2014) states are 
fully capable of strategic action and there is more research necessary on how states shield 
themselves from pressure by domestic actors.  
   In this study the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the efficacy of the 
Convention will be analysed by the theory of domestic mobilisation and advocacy efforts. 
According to Jasper Krommendijk the domestic mobilisation of the Convention in general is 
present and strong in the Netherlands. The Convention gets a lot of attention within the 
government. on the Rights of the Child These findings are related to frequently mentioning 
and agenda setting of the Convention in policy documents of the government. Krommendijk 
concludes that the “responses of the Dutch government, show that the Concluding 
Observations of the Committee might eventually be implemented when they are taken up and 
lobbied by domestic actors, whether NGO’s, parliament or the media” (Krommendijk 2014, 
13). Besides, he also shows that the implementation often requires a long process of political 
mobilisation. Karin Kloosterboer, children’s rights expert, agrees on this and gives the 
example of the implementation of the kinderombudsman, which took more than 20 years of 
lobbying practices
41
.  
  The factor ‘advocacy’ is crucial for the Convention, because the Concluding 
Observations are mainly used by NGO’s and other domestic actors to support their arguments, 
or legitimise their actions. The Concluding Observations do not have the effect of compliance 
on their own. According to Krommendijk, the Dutch Children’s Rights Coalition ‘het 
Kinderrechtencollectief’ is “the most important non-governmental actor involved in the 
process of state reporting under the Convention” (Krommendijk 2014, 223). The coalition 
was founded in 1995 and is the platform that consists of several independent NGO’s and civil 
society actors, including UNICEF the Netherlands and Defence for Children (DCI). Another 
explanation for the high level of domestic mobilisation in relation to the Convention is the 
response on children’s rights in the wider society. “Nobody wants to be seen as not in favour 
                                                          
41 Interview 2 
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of children’s rights” (Krommendijk 2014, 16). It is widely acknowledged that children are by 
definition on of the most vulnerable groups in need of protection. 
  However, even though there is a strong political mobilisation for the Convention the 
position of children in the immigration policies has been subordinated and the Convention is 
frequently violated. This will be analysed in the next section of the study by the theory of 
political mobilisation and advocacy, supported by additional interviews with stakeholders. 
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3. Non-compliance with the Convention in the immigration policies 
In this section the violations of the Convention within the immigration policies will be 
analysed by the theory ‘political mobilisation and advocacy’ of Simmons (2009) and by the 
additional interviews performed for this study. In total 14 interviews took place with 
stakeholders in the field of immigration: four persons from three human rights organizations 
(interest groups), three policy officers of the Ministry of Security and Justice, two policy 
officers of political parties, two lawyers, a policy officer of a local government, a guardian 
and a scholar.
42
 These interviews are of added value to this study, because all the stakeholders 
have a different position within the field of immigration policies and view this subject from 
different angles: from a political, executive, juridical and an advocacy perspective.
43
   
  Several stakeholders have expressed different points of view. Their opinions give an 
indication of the state of compliance from a more practical angle. The interview questions 
were about their stand on the position of the child within immigration policies, how they view 
the different positions of stakeholders (government, judge, lawyer, interest groups etc.), if 
they would argue that the Convention is ensured in the immigration policies and to what 
extent the Convention is sufficiently ensured in their opinion.
44
 
  The theory on political mobilisation and advocacy shows that the political 
mobilisation, as also Krommendijk (2014) argues, is highly present and effective, even though 
the Convention is not fully complied within the immigration policies as described in the 
former chapters. This position was confirmed by 10 out of 14 interviewees.
45
 In short, there 
are three explanations for the lack of compliance of the Convention. Before this will be 
outlined, first the general view that resulted from the interviews will be discussed.  
General view of the stakeholders   
The general interpretation of the interviewees of the purpose of the Dutch immigration 
policies is that the policies are restrictive. This is not very remarkable, because the purpose of 
the regulation in the coalition agreement Bruggen Slaan has also been described as 
restrictive.
46
 Besides this general view, the interviewees had different thoughts about how 
legitimate the restrictive policy is in relation to the position of the child. The government 
                                                          
42 See appendix 1 for the organizations and persons that are interviewed for this study.  
43 Interview 13 and 14. 
44 See appendix II 
45 Interviews 1-15.  
46 Bruggen slaan, Coalition agreement VVD-PvdA, October 29 2012 (Cabinet Rutte II), ve12002172. 
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authorities
47
 and the policy officer from the political party PvdA
48
 (this group will be named 
in the text as “stakeholders A”)49 argue that the position of the child has been taken into 
consideration in the immigration policies.
50
 In contrast, the human rights organizations, 
lawyers, guardianship organization Nidos, a policy officer of the political party Christenunie, 
a policy officer of the local government and of a policy officer of the Child Protection Board 
(this group will be named in the text as “stakeholders B”)51 argue that the policy has not given 
sufficient attention to the position of the child.  
  According to stakeholders B, the best interest of the child is not the first consideration 
within the immigration policies. During most interviews, stakeholders A and B point out that 
there are conflicting interests between the Convention and the immigration policies. This can 
be illustrated by a quote of Shamir Ceuleers (Christenunie):“the immigration policy consists 
of conflicting interests and the friction this creates in the implementation. First, the 
government has the duty to protect refugees in the Netherlands according to the Convention 
of Refugees. Second, the government does not want to open the border completely which is 
related to the fear of a growing influx of refugees”.52  
  The intention of the government is to make policy in the child’s best interest, but 
according to an interviewed policy advisor from the Direction Migration Policy of the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice
53
 “the best interest of the child is an important interest to consider, but not 
always the most important interest to look at first”.54 According to the Direction Migration 
Policy procedural interests are in some cases more important than the primary consideration 
of the child. Furthermore, they argue that the interest of the child is correctly considered in the 
policy and argue that the parents also have a responsibility to act in the child’s best interest.55  
  The stakeholders’ opinions are divided on this point. The governmental authorities’ 
argument on parental responsibility is geared towards the view that parents should take the 
decision of voluntary returns after all legal remedies are exhausted. The voluntary returns 
should avoid children ending up in detention and prevent children to develop roots in the 
Netherlands, both of which may have consequences of psychological damage (Kalverboer and 
                                                          
47
 Directie Migratiebeleid en Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek (Direction Migration Policy and Immigration authority on return 
and departure). 
48 Labor party: Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA). 
49 Stakeholders A argue that the Convention is ensured in the immigration policy of the Netherlands and had similar answers 
on the interview questions.  
50 Interview 13. 
51 Stakeholders B argue that the Convention is on different parts violated in the immigration policy of the Netherlands and 
had similar answers on the interview questions. 
52 Interview 11. 
53
 Directie Migratiebeleid 
54 See 39 
55 See 39  
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Zijlstra, 2006). In contrast, stakeholders B argue that children can indeed become victims of 
their parents’ decision and argue that it should be the responsibility of the government to 
protect these children from the consequences of their parent’s decisions. Besides, the human 
rights organizations blame the government that the procedure is designed for adults and does 
not make a distinction between parents and children, as in most cases one of the parents is the 
main applicant for asylum for the whole family (Kalverboer & Zijlstra 2008, 7).  
  Important to mention here is the notion that acting in the child’s best interest is 
sometimes interpreted as equal to giving all refugee children a residence permit. The 
stakeholders who argue that the policy should be in line with the Convention do not mean that 
return is never in the best interest of a child. They argue that under some conditions the 
procedure prioritizes the interest of the parents and/or the government over the interest of the 
child:
56
 UNICEF the Netherlands: “A forced return can also sometimes be in the best interest 
of the child. However, this should be supported by the right reasons”. 57 
The effectiveness of political mobilisation and advocacy  
According to the research of Krommendijk and the results of the interviews, the advocacy for 
compliance with the Convention, compared to other ratified treaties in the Netherlands, is 
strong and effective (Krommendijk 2014). As stated by several authors, compliance depends 
on effective advocacy (Simmons 2009; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Krommendijk 2014). 
How can non-compliance of the Convention with the immigration policy be explained by 
Simmons when the advocacy is effective on this area? The answer is to be found in the fact  
that the theory of Simmons is not only focused on the effectiveness of interest groups’, such 
as human rights organizations, but also on the realization of domestic mobilisation which 
consists of all involved stakeholders and not only the interest groups (Simmons 2009, 125-
127). According to Germa Lourens from Nidos it is also the responsibility of the lawyers and 
guardians to inform the immigration authority about the position of the child. “It is not only 
the responsibility of the immigration authority (IND), but all the involved stakeholders should 
take action”.58  
 Simmons (2009) described three mechanisms within the theory of ‘political 
mobilisation and advocacy’. Two of the three mechanisms as described in the former chapter, 
agenda setting’ and using ‘international treaties as a tool, are present within this case, but 
there is a lack of the third mechanism ‘leverage of litigation’. The first two mechanisms 
                                                          
56 Interviews 1 -12 
57 Interview 1,2 
58 Interview 7 
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‘agenda setting’ and using ‘international treaties as a tool’ are both well conducted by the 
interest groups and other stakeholders such as the political parties in the opposition (Simmons 
2009, 135). The effectiveness of agenda setting of the Convention is according to 
Krommendijk the main impact of the interest groups (Krommendijk 2014). Several 
interviewed stakeholders confirmed this position. The advocacy which consists mainly of 
human rights organizations, lawyers and political parties considered the advocacy strong and 
highly present.
59
  
  According to Daniel Tempelman from the Labor party
60
, the advocacy around 
children’s rights and immigration policies is very effective, illustrated by the examples of the 
Kinderpardon and the issue of refugee children in detention. In case of the Kinderpardon both 
the children’s ombudsman and the children’s rights organization Defence for Children did 
pressure the government with media outreach.  A research report on the effect of detention on 
children, Coalition Kind in de Cel was published.
61
 This resulted in a government hearing on 
this subject with experts and members of parliament and in a general debate on immigration 
policies in general. However, in several interviews the advocacy has also been described as 
one-sided. Within this, stakeholders observed that the advocacy has in some cases less effect 
than it could have on state behaviour or in statements of the court. Corien Ullersma illustrates 
this as “there is no counter argument against the stated opinions by the interest groups”.62 
Suggestions that have been given by the interviewees are to incorporate support from 
governmental authorities in their research and/or report to influence policies. Within this a 
more neutral stand can be reached. Karin Kloosterboer from UNICEF the Netherlands gives 
the example of the research Kind in het centrum
63
. This research has been conducted in 
cooperation with the governmental authority for housing: Centraal Orgaan opvang 
Asielzoekers (COA).
64
As conclusion, compliance could be improved by cooperation between 
the stakeholders in the field of immigration. 
  For the third mechanism Simmons argues that the leverage of litigation is influencing 
domestic mobilisation. This implies that ratified treaties (among others) have implications for 
the role of judiciary. In her theory, Simmons gives the Netherlands as an example in which 
                                                          
59 Interviews 1-12. 
60 Interview 10.  
61
 The report ‘Papa, hebben we iets ergs gedaan: Kinderen en Ouders in Vreemdelingendetentie’ from the Coalitie Geen 
Kind in de Cel (2014). Translation: ‘Daddy did we do something wrong: Children and their parents in Detention of Aliens’ 
from the Coalition No Child in Prison (2014). 
62 Interview 8 
63 Child in the center.  
   see: http://www.kind-in-azc.nl/onderzoek.aspx  
64 Interview 2 
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ratified treaties are integrated in the domestic legal system. This means that international legal 
obligations are directly enforceable in domestic courts (Simmons 2009, 130-133). However, 
as we have seen in chapter one, not all the articles of the Convention have direct effect on the 
Dutch legal system. If an article within a treaty does not have direct effect, no rights have to 
be derived by the court. This weakens the leverage of litigation mechanism and imposes an 
important role on the lawyers to improve the use of the Convention within the immigration 
policies According to Simmons (2009), litigation is often part of a broader political strategy, 
besides claiming rights in the domestic courts. “litigation in national courts is one of the best 
strategies available for creating homegrown pro-rights jurisprudence” (Simmons 2009, 131).   
  According to the interviewed lawyers the rules within the immigration law are 
complex. “The immigration policies consist of numerous rules focused on not allowing 
refugees into the Netherlands”,65 according to lawyer Pieter Bogaers.  Lawyer Corrien 
Ullersma argues: “the policy is not about protecting refugees, but mainly about providing 
evidence in order to comply with the rules”.66 In her opinion the main purpose of the policy 
relies on forced returns instead of protecting the refugees. Furthermore, there is criticism on 
immigration lawyers in general. Expertise on immigration law by lawyers is minimal and is 
mainly part of various jurisdictions in which lawyers operate, according to both Bogaers and 
Ullersma.
67
 In addition, both lawyers mentioned that time is an issue. Each individual case 
takes a lot of time, which does not always pays off. Pieter Bogaers argues “most lawyers do 
not take the time for the personal stories of their clients”.68  
  The minimal role of the immigration judge, as described in chapter 2, makes it 
difficult to determine whether the Convention is actually considered during the immigration 
authorities’ decision. When compared to a criminal judge, who is allowed to do his own 
research to the correctness of using the Convention and the best interest of the child (art. 3 
UNCRC), the immigration court has a marginal position. However, according to research of 
the centre for Children’s Rights of the University of Amsterdam, the use of the Convention in 
jurisprudence has increased, mainly by the lower courts (Limbeek 2012, 170-173). 
Nonetheless, although the research concludes that there is an increase in jurisprudence, the 
Convention is just mentioned and seldom fully taken into account (Limbeek 2012, 170-173). 
  Furthermore, there have been remarks by the Centre of Children’s Rights and by both 
interviewed lawyers, that using the European law makes the case stronger. Mainly article 24 
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of the Charter, and article 5 and 8 ECHR are likely to be honored, because of their direct 
effect on the case. The interviews confirmed that lawyers can make a stronger case with the 
combination of European law and the Convention, compared to only referring to the 
Convention (Limbeek 2012, 170-173).  
  Overall, the lack of the mechanism ‘leverage of litigation’ can be explained by the fact 
that the immigration law is very complex and conflicts often with the Convention. This makes 
it difficult to implement the Convention in the immigration law and enforce compliance.  
The interest of the Dutch government 
So far this study has shown how the political mobilisation and advocacy of human rights 
organizations in the Netherlands are effective, while the legal system of the immigration law 
creates weaknesses and complexity for compliance with the Convention. However, also the 
political and executive perspectives have influence on compliance. Thomas (2014) argues 
“the literature incorrectly assumes, at least implicitly, that transnational dynamics are 
automatically conducive to the protection of human rights. The question is just by how much” 
(Thomas 2014, 11). The theory of ‘political mobilisation and advocacy’ does not give an 
indication when a treaty is fully complied. The question that remains unanswered is ’when are 
we satisfied?’.  
  Full compliance of a treaty will always be a process and a challenge. “Implementing a 
treaty is never fully accomplishable”, as Rodrigues notes69. “Not every signature of a human 
rights treaty will be followed by radical changes in state behaviour” as Thomas (2014) puts it. 
This study argues that domestic mobilisation and advocacy are both important factors for the 
success of a treaty like the Convention. Immigration policies on political level are a sensitive 
topic and political interests, or in this case procedural interests, trump the interests and rights 
of children.
70
  
  Firstly, this is related to the weak form of compliance pull in international law in 
contrast with national law. This is partly a consequence of the fact that even if the Convention 
is binding, there are no sanctions related to the actions of the government (Thomas 2014, 4). 
Secondly, the violations can be explained by the ‘high costs’ of following the Convention and 
especially following article 3 ‘the best interest of the child’ as the primary consideration. 
These costs are influenced by the perceived threat of a growing influx of refugees. Karen 
Temmink of the executive governmental authority (DTV) argues “the government creates 
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constant pressure, because of the high influx of refugees”71. The fact that the government 
states that the Convention is an important consideration but not always the most important 
factor  indicates that the costs of compliance are in some cases too high for the political and 
procedural interests of the government. In the majority of the interviews, it was mentioned 
that focus on restraining the influx and on stimulating returns was thought as more important 
than the position of the child and the responsibility of the government to protect refugees 
when they enter the Netherlands
72
.  
  Thirdly, stakeholders A argue that the implementation of the position of the child in 
the immigration policy is complex. They mention in their interviews, that they understand the 
stand of the interests groups on the position of the child, because their main priority is 
compliance of the Convention. In contrast, the government has the responsibility to include all  
aspects and interests that are part of the immigration policies thereby creating friction on 
different fronts of the policy. According to Karent Temmink the implementation of the policy 
is very demanding.
73
 It is difficult to foresee the consequences of certain policies. She argues 
that “the Convention is about the individual child, which makes it difficult to implement the 
Convention in the policy in general”74. 
   The perspectives of the stakeholders give an indication of how they experience 
compliance of the Convention and which problems they encounter when trying to act in the 
best interest of the child. Interviewers were asked: ‘when are you satisfied with the level of 
compliance?”. The most common answer was related to the statement of Cardol Goos, legal 
advisor Child Protection Board: “when people know what has been written down in the 
Convention and they understand what to do with it”75.  
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73 Interview 14 
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4. Conclusion 
The primary question in this study is: ‘why is the immigration policy non-compliant with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child? 
  The Netherlands signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995 
and thereby made a commitment to the Convention, to the children in the Netherlands and to 
the international society. This study illustrates non-compliance with the Convention in the 
immigration policy by three practical examples. These examples show that the immigration 
policies violate the Convention on different levels in the asylum procedure, at entering the 
Netherlands and/or returning to the country of origin and in the effect of forced return and 
long-lasting procedures on children. The first example is about the consequences of children 
being kept in detention which violates the Convention. Detention should only be used as an 
ultimate remedy, according to art.37 of the Convention, instead of being part of the regular 
immigration policies. The second example is about the damaging consequences of children 
frequently moving during the procedure. The third example is about the agreed  Kinderpardon 
violating the Convention criteria of equality. The Kinderpardon agreement is aimed for 
children that become victims of long-lasting procedures. However, only asylum-seeking 
children and children that are supervised by the central government can apply for this 
Kinderpardon. Refugee children that are not part of the criteria are not ‘qualified’ for a 
residence permit, regardless of being victims of long-lasting procedures.  
  Despite the best intentions of the responsible organisations, in this case the Ministry of 
Security and Justice, the Convention has frequently been violated because the Dutch 
government does not always take the best interest of the child into account as the primary 
consideration. According to article 3 of the Convention ‘the best interest of the child’, should 
be the primary consideration in every decision of the government, legal bodies, private and 
social institutions and others. The government states that the Convention has been taken into 
account in the immigration policies, but is not always considered as the most important 
interest. Besides the position of the child, the government is also obliged to consider other 
interests that influence the immigration field. Furthermore, the government assumes the 
Convention is adequately considered and is therefore not necessary to be taken (once more) 
into account by the executive bodies. In contrast, the human rights organizations, as interest 
groups, argue that by not taking the best interest of the child as the primary consideration is a 
violation of the Convention. This position is also expected from the executive body of the 
government, because policymakers cannot always be aware of the consequences of the 
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implementation which can have an effect on children.  
  In this study the theory of Simmons (2009) ‘political mobilisation and advocacy’ is 
used to analyse non-compliance with the Convention in immigration policy. According to this 
theory the effectiveness of a treaty is mainly the result of advocacy and pressure of domestic 
actors on the government. Concerning the Convention in the immigration policies, the 
mobilisation by human rights organizations is present and strong in the Netherlands. Research 
of Krommendijk argues that the advocacy around the Convention in the Netherlands is the 
most effective in comparison to other treaties. Therefore the question that comes up is how to 
explain the violations of the Convention. First, there is a lack of compliance pull, because 
there is no international central authority to identify and punish violators. Even though the 
Convention is binding, because of the absence of sanctions compliance is difficult to ensure. 
Second, although the advocacy around the Convention is effective the interviews showed that 
pressure by advocacy is one-sided. The interviewees argued that influencing policies by 
cooperation with a governmental authority could be an addition to the effectiveness of 
pressuring state behaviour. 
  Third, important improvements can be made on the leverage of litigation, the third 
mechanism of the theory of Simmons. The legal structure and jurisprudence do not give the 
possibility to the Convention to be ‘integrated’ in the immigration law. Articles of the 
Convention that are relevant to refugee children do not all have direct effect and thereby no 
rights have to be derived by the court. In addition, immigration law is part of administrative 
law, which means that the court has a marginal position to assess the Convention within 
immigration cases. Furthermore, refugee children fall in principle under the immigration law 
instead of, as every child with a Dutch nationality, under the juvenile law. This juvenile law is 
especially designed with the protection and specific interests of children in mind. Therefore, 
mainly the lawyers are in the position and have the responsibility to bring the Convention 
forward in the proceedings.  
  As a final conclusion, there is a friction between the duty of the state to protect minor, 
refugees, and the state’s objective to implement restrictive policies.  
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5. Recommendations 
According to the theory of Simmons and the interviews taken, this study showed different 
factors why the Convention is not fully complied within the Dutch immigration policies. 
In this section some recommendations will be suggested based on the findings of this 
study.  
1. Incorporate more collaboration between the government and the interest groups, in this 
case human rights organization, to overcome the impression of an one-sided advocacy. 
2. Investigate if improvements can be made in the legislation of the immigration field. 
For example, Rodrigues suggests introducing a juvenile judge in the immigration law 
in order to improve the position of the child in the immigration policies (Rodrigues 
2012, 21-22).  
3. Introduce (more) trainings, organized by the human rights organizations, about the 
interpretation of ‘the best interest of the child’. General comment 14 could be a useful 
tool to understand the best interest of a child and perhaps helpful to make the 
implementation of the Convention more clear.
76
  
4. Investigate the possibility to define the boundaries of the responsibility of the parents 
and of the government when it comes to “the best interest of the child” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 General comment No 14 (2013), on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration 
(art. 3, para. 1). 
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Appendix I - Interviews 
1. Majorie Kaandorp Children’s Rights expert at UNICEF the 
Netherlands 
2. Karin Kloosterboer Children’s Rights expert at UNICEF the 
Netherlands  
3. Annemarie Busser Policy officer at  
Amnesty International  
4. Carla van Os Program manager Children’s Rights and 
Migration at Defence for Children 
5. Prof. mr. P.R. 
Rodrigues 
University of Leiden 
6. Niene Oepkes Senior policy officer local government 
Utrecht 
7. Germa Lourens Youth Protector and project leader of the 
project European Dublin Guardianship 
from the (Guardianship) Institution Nidos 
8. Corien Ullersma Lawyer Prakken d’Oliveira 
9. Pieter Bogaers Lawyer As Advocaten 
10. Daniel Tempelman Policy officer Labor Party (PvdA).  
11. Shamir Ceuleers Policy officer political party Christenunie. 
12. Goos Cardol Legal advisor Child Protection Board, 
Ministry of Security and Justice.  
13. Anonymous Direction Migration Policy, Ministry of 
Security and Justice (in Dutch Directie 
Migratiebeleid). 
14. Karin Temmink Government authority Migration Return, 
Ministry Security and of Justice (Dienst 
Terugkeer en Vertrek) 
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Appendix II - Interview questions 
The following questions were used during the interviews. The questions are not necessarily 
asked in the indicated order. Besides, not all questions were applicable to each stakeholder.  
1. Can you shortly describe your background and current function(s)?  Please, give me an 
indication of the activities your work consists of? 
2. What is your impression of the immigration policies (in general) in the Netherlands? 
3. What is in your opinion the purpose of the Dutch immigration policy? 
4. What is your point of view on the position of the child in the immigration policy? 
5. Within this, how important is, according to you, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child? 
6. Do you make use of the Convention within your work activities?  
 Yes, in what way and can you give an example? 
No, why not? 
7. Are there situations in which the Convention is not (completely) complied? 
If yes, could you give an example? 
8. Are there frictions between the immigration policies and the Convention? 
9. How do you qualify the role of the following actors in relation to the Convention in 
the immigration policy? 
- The Ministry of Security and Justice 
- Lower House of Parliament 
- Human rights organizations 
- The court 
- The lawyers  
- The media 
10. How do you qualify the impact of the interest groups around this topic? 
11. Are there improvements necessary in the immigration policy in relation to the position 
of the child? 
12. Could you mention and explain examples of non-compliance of the Convention in the 
immigration policy? (only asked if the stakeholder argues that the Convention is not 
complied in the policy) 
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